Anti-Communist and Authoritarian Allies: US Foreign Policy with Paraguay and Chile During the Cold War

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ABSTRACT

During the Cold War, the United States was focused on containing communism and ensuring the stability of non-communist governments. Stability within governments was highly prioritized, as it was less likely to fall to communism, as this could only occur during a regime change or if the people elected a more progressive-leaning president. This paper focuses on how US foreign policy during the Cold War, particularly in Latin America, was focused on ensuring this anti-communist stability, oftentimes to the detriment of democratic ideals. While United States leaders and politicians framed their support of governments in South America as interventions for the purpose of stopping communism and spreading democracy, in reality, these leaders supported repressive, authoritarian leaders and valued anti-communism and stability over human life and democracy. By examining how the United States interacted with Paraguayan and Chilean dictators Alfredo Stroessner and Augusto Pinochet, I argue that the United States' over-focus on halting communism in its international intervention during the Cold War caused politicians and the public to largely ignore authoritarian regimes in South America in order to maintain stability in the region, despite purporting anti-communist ideals as a way to spread democracy.

INTRODUCTION

During the Cold War, the United States focused on containing communism and ensuring the political stability of non-communist governments. Stability within governments was highly prioritized since stable governments were less likely to fall to communism; most countries adopted communism during regime changes or if the people elected a progressive-leaning president. This paper focuses on how US foreign policy during the Cold War, particularly in Latin America, was focused on ensuring this anti-communist stability, oftentimes to the detriment of democratic ideals. Despite purporting anti-communist ideals as a way to spread democracy and in order to maintain stability in South America, this paper argues that the US had an overfocus on halting communism in its international intervention during the Cold War, as shown through how the US interacted with Paraguayan and Chilean dictators Alfredo Stroessner and Augusto Pinochet, which caused politicians and the public to largely ignore authoritarian regimes in South America.

HISTORIOGRAPHY OF US INTERVENTION DURING THE COLD WAR

Following World War II, historians and political scientists began to characterize US intervention as a moral endeavor and as a way for the US to spread democracy to combat the Soviet Union's spread of communism. Mid-twentieth-century scholars cite resistance to communism as a moral obligation for why the US transitioned from a policy of nonintervention to a policy of intervention. Historian Arthur P. Whitaker's article "The United States in Latin America Since 1865" maps the relationship between the US and Latin America, highlighting how the US supported the overthrow of the communist Guatemalan government in 1954.[1] Whitaker frames this action as a success of US intervention in the region, as it showed an example of a moral intervention to aid in the spread of democracy. Scholar Theodore Wright's article "Free Elections in the Latin American Policy of the United States" mentions failed attempts by the US government to support elections in Latin America from the Spanish-American War in 1898 until the Good Neighbor Policy of 1933. Wright argues that America used elections as a way to combat communism because of "Soviet resistance to free elections."[2] Additionally, historian Ernest R. May wrote in 1963 about the history of American intervention specifically as it related to Latin America, focusing less on communism but still discussing the moral reasons behind US intervention in the region.[3] The historiography of American intervention in the years following World War II began to focus on moral and democratic issues, with historians generally being supportive of American policy.

However, beginning in the 1960s, a shift in the historiography of US intervention is evident as American historians became more critical of American Cold War policy. Historian William Appleman Williams began critiquing American foreign policy as early as 1959, commenting on both the ideology behind and the execution of US intervention in foreign nations.[4] The shift to a perspective that was more critical of American intervention was popularized by New Left Historians during the late 1960s and into the early 1970s. Historians began to question whether or not the containment of communism sufficiently justified intervention in other countries, particularly as communism began to spread beyond Soviet-controlled countries.[5] The apparent lack of success in

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[1] Arthur P. Whitaker, "The United States in Latin America Since 1865," *Current History* 28, no. 163 (1955).
[2] Theodore P. Wright, "Free Elections in the Latin American Policy of the United States," *Political Science Quarterly* 74, no. 1 (1959): 89.
[3] May credits a humanitarian sentiment for intervention in Cuba in 1898 and a moral obligation to Latin American countries as a small part of the motivation for Roosevelt's Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. See in Ernest R. May, "The Alliance for Progress in Historical Perspective," *Foreign Affairs* 41, no. 4 (1963): 761, 763.
[4] The first edition of Williams' book was published in 1959 with the second edition being published in 1962. Williams opens the second edition of his book *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* by describing American iIntervention in Cuba. He describes this intervention as a violation of American neutrality and asks the question of whether concepts of traditional American diplomacy are sound or contradictory. See in William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (Dell Publishing, 1962), 6.
[5] Hans J. Morgenthau, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene," *Foreign Affairs* 45, no. 3 (1967): 432.

minimizing the spread of communism through US intervention in foreign countries contributed to the growing criticism of intervention policies, as seen in how historians understand intervention into Latin America and the Caribbean. For example, politician and historian George C. Lodge criticized American foreign policy in Latin America for not providing enough actual change and for lacking ideological strength, citing US military assistance and intervention as part of the reason for this lack of power.[6] In addition to critiquing the interventionist ideology, historians have also criticized the moral justification of American intervention present in post-World War II historiography. Scholar David E. Weischadle utilizes political and diplomatic documents to examine the US's paternalistic attitude toward other nations, particularly those in Latin America. He critiques the outcome of this moral attitude, calling it "the most irritating but also the least productive" way to structure foreign intervention.[7] Together, these critiques mark a historiographical turning point in which scholars increasingly challenged both the effectiveness and the moral legitimacy of US Cold War interventionism.

Contemporary historians have built on the historiography contributed by New Left historians, continuing to critique historians of the early Cold War who justified US intervention as a moral imperative. Thomas J. McCormick's book *America's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After* shows a continuity of these New Left critiques, arguing that intervention methods such as economic and military assistance were used to support American hegemony as opposed to supporting the development of individual countries.[8] McCormick's book focuses on establishing and supporting how the US used anti-communist intervention as a way to solidify American hegemony, showing how stopping the spread of communism served American self-interest during the Cold War. While criticism is ongoing regarding American motivation for intervention, contemporary historians are also creating a new historiographical approach that focuses more on the transnational history of US intervention. This transnational historical method emphasizes the negative consequences, such as ongoing political instability, of US intervention, particularly in Latin America.[9] Newer writings also include a tighter focus on individual historical actors. These actors can be used to reveal new information about US intervention, largely thanks to

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[6] Lodge comments that intervention has been characterized by contradictory goals of helping Latin America stay politically stable while also wanting to enact anti-communist and pro-American change. See in George C. Lodge, "US Aid to Latin America: Funding Radical Change," *Foreign Affairs* 47, no. 4 (1969): 738.
United States military intervention is also analyzed in Harold Molineu's 1973 article. See in Harold Molineu, "The Concept of the Caribbean in the Latin American Policy of the United States," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 15, no. 3 (1973).
[7] David E. Weischadle, "Paternalism: A View of the Latin American Foreign Policy of the United States, 1823–1934," *The Social Sciences* 61, no. 6 (1970): 269.
[8] Thomas J. McCormick, *America's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the CoOld War and After*, (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), xiv.
[9] Stephen G. Rabe, *The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America* (Oxford University Press, 2012): xxxvii.

new historical sources becoming available.[10] This paper will fit into these contemporary conversations about transnational and biographical historiographies by examining how actors such as Alfredo Stroessner and Augusto Pinochet interacted with the American government. It will show how US intervention in South America during the Cold War fit within an anti-communist framework, but contradicted American values of democracy and human rights through its support of authoritarian dictators.

PARAGUAY UNDER ALFREDO STROESSNER

EARLY YEARS OF THE STRONATO

Alfredo Stroessner's regime in Paraguay officially began in May 1954. At this time, the US was largely focused on maintaining the political stability of the Stroessner administration, also known as the Stronato, to prevent Paraguay from falling to communism. On September 1, 1955, a dispatch from the Paraguayan chargé—a diplomat who serves in a country's embassy as second in line after the ambassador—to the Department of State, Andrew B. Wardlaw, wrote that Stroessner's position one year after his installation remained strong despite a "substantial part" of the population being opposed to the administration. According to Wardlaw, opposition groups did not have the capacity to seriously contest the military force of the administration.[11] The language of the dispatch shows that, even at the onset of the Stronato, the US was aware of public dissent toward the administration, and, more crucial to US foreign policy, the importance of Paraguayan military power to the stability of an authoritarian regime. To further ensure this militaristic stability, the US accepted Paraguayan military officers into training facilities so Paraguay's military would be able to "fend off Communist threats" in South America.[12] The US also provided economic support

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[10] Kirk Tyvela's book *The Dictator Dilemma: The United States and Paraguay in the Cold War* focuses on the relationship between the United States and Paraguay during the dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner. Tyvela criticizes the work done by Frank O. Mora and Jerry W. Cooney in their book *Paraguay and the United States: Distant Allies* (2007) for not being "informed by archival sources."
See in Kirk Tyvela, *The Dictator Dilemma: The United States and Paraguay in the Cold War* (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2019).
Patrick Iber's *Neither Peace nor Freedom: The Cultural Cold War in Latin America* analyzes the World Peace Council, the Congress for Cultural Freedom, and the Casa de las Américas. See in Patrick Iber, *Neither Peace nor Freedom: The Cultural Cold War in Latin America* (Harvard University Press, 2015).
Kissinger in Latin America: Intervention, Human Rights, and Diplomacy by Stephen G. Rabe uses archives from the US National Archives, presidential libraries, and electronic archives to discuss Kissinger's career as it specifically relates to Latin America.
Stephen G. Rabe, *Kissinger and Latin America: Intervention, Human Rights, and Diplomacy* (Cornell University Press, 2020).
[11] Andrew B. Wardlaw, "Despatch From the Chargé in Paraguay (Wardlaw) to the Department of State," September 1, 1955, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, American Republics: Central and South America, Volume VII*, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v07/d494.
[12] Along with training military officers, the United States also provided arms and expanded the presence of military advisers in Asunción. Jerry W. Cooney and Frank O. Mora, *Paraguay and the United States: Distant Allies* (The University of Georgia Press, 2007), 134.

to the country.[13] The perceived stability of the Stronato through military force supported the US's decision to continue providing Paraguay with military and economic support, as the US became confident that Paraguay would not fall to communism. While Paraguay did experience some guerrilla activities during the late 1950s and early 1960s, the US government was not concerned about the activity.[14] This was largely due to the Stronato's developing reputation for state repression and violence. In this way, early US engagement with Stroessner's regime demonstrates how anti-communist priorities outweighed concerns about authoritarian governance in Paraguay.

Along with wanting to support the stability of the country, support for the Stroessner regime also came from its verbal commitment to anti-communism. In a memorandum summarizing a conversation with President Dwight Eisenhower, which occurred in Panama on July 23, 1956, Stroessner expressed "that Paraguay was one-hundred percent anti-communist and would continue to be so," while also expressing gratitude to the US Army and Air Force for its military missions in Paraguay.[15] The reiteration of the country's commitment to being anti-communist, and mentioning the military support the US was providing to the country, demonstrates how economic and military support were given to Stroessner's regime as a way to uplift anti-communist sentiments. It was not only Stroessner himself who spoke on Paraguay's commitment to anti-communism. In 1962, the Paraguayan foreign minister said his country did not fear a communist takeover, and "stressed" that the country would support measures to fight the communist control of Cuba.[16] This further illustrates the Paraguayan politicians' commitment to maintaining a non-communist stable regime. This politically stable, anti-communist commitment was key to the US-Paraguay relationship.

The Kennedy and Johnson Years

Despite supporting the regime for its anti-communist ideology, the US was aware of the Stronato's lack of democracy. As the US entered the John F. Kennedy administration, concerns over state repression and authoritarianism, along with attempts to advance democracy, became prevalent in foreign policy. The Alliance for Progress, an aid program started by Kennedy, sought to improve the socio-

[13] The United States provided over twenty-four million dollars in bilateral economic and military assistance in addition to over ten million dollars in loans through Eximbank from 1954-1960. Kirk Tyvela, *The Dictator Dilemma: The United States and Paraguay in the Cold War* (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2019), 27.
Between 1954 and 1969, the US accounted for close to 17 percent of Paraguay's national defense budget. Stephen G. Rabe, "Kissinger and Friends: Paraguay, Brazil, and Uruguay," in *Kissinger and Latin America: Intervention, Human Rights, and Diplomacy* (Cornell University Press, 2020), 87.
[14] Cooney and Mora, *Paraguay and the United States*, 151.
[15] "Memorandum of a Conversation, Embassy Residence, Panama City," July 23, 1956, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, American Republics: Central and South America, Volume VII,* history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-5707/d500
[16] "Memorandum of conversation among Foreign Ministers of the American Republics," October 2, 1962, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volumes X/Xi/XII, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics; Cuba 1961-1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath,* https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v1commitment0-12mSupp/d311

economic condition of Latin American countries. This policy was put into place in reaction to the Castro communist regime in Cuba; impoverished Latin American nations would be less susceptible to communist takeovers if they became modernized and experienced some social reform.[17] Through the Alliance for Progress, the US was able to apply political pressure on Paraguay to promote some democratization of the authoritarian regime, such as the opening of elections to opposition parties. After being told that US aid would become conditional upon political reform, Stroessner introduced changes such as lifting the ban on opposition political parties in 1962.[18] This demonstrates US political awareness of the authoritarian nature of the Stronato, as politicians were attempting to loosen the authoritarian nature of Stroessner's regime through supporting democratic elections.

The American people were aware of the authoritarian nature of the Paraguayan and other Latin American dictatorships. An article in *The Daily News* of the US Virgin Islands criticizes the Nicaraguan and Paraguayan governments for lacking freedom of the press, calling suppressing news information tyrannical.[19] American journalists directly calling the Stronato a suppressive and tyrannical regime is demonstrative of how people within the US were aware of the authoritarian nature of the Paraguayan regime. The US's democratizing requirement for aid was also reported in the newspaper *Diario las Américas*, a Florida-based Spanish-language newspaper. This article reads that Stroessner should not have had a problem introducing these reforms, as there was already a set of tactics for this type of liberalization work among Latin American dictatorships.[20] It emphasizes how political reforms are necessary for social reforms to be effective in Paraguay. As advancing democracy was touted as the primary motivation for the US's intervention in other countries, the US would need to apply pressure in order for the country to democratize.

With his incremental changes, Stroessner continued to rule with few consequences from the US. Anti-communism was still seen as the primary ideological motivation behind US policy in Latin America, limiting the amount of democratization efforts that would succeed in Paraguay. Officials during the Kennedy administration had begun to "embrace" authoritarian leaders as allies in the fight to contain communism in Cuba and to keep the rest of Latin America

[17] Tyvela, *Dictator Dilemma,* 56.
[18] Frank O. Mora, "The Forgotten Relationship: United States-Paraguay Relations, 1937-89," *Journal of Contemporary History* 33, no. 3 (1998): 462. https://www-jstor-org.proxy2.library.illinois.edu/stable/261125?seq=12
[19] *The Daily News of the Virgin Islands*, "Free Press, Free People,"April 3, 1962, from Library of Congress *Chronicling America Historic American Newspapers* https://www.loc.gov/item/sn83025327/1962-04-03/ed-1/.
[20] N. Viera Altamirano, *Diarios las Américas*, "Reformas sociales sin producción mayor de riqueza," July 11, 1962, from Library of Congress *Chronicling America Historic American Newspapers*, https://www.loc.gov/resource/sn82001257/1962-07-11/ed-1/?sp=2&q=paraguay&r=0.562,0.229,0.626,0.3,authoritarian0

safe from communism.[21] Concerns about the stability of the Stroessner regime as an anti-communist government had surpassed the importance of social and political reforms in the authoritarian state. This attitude continued into the Lyndon B. Johnson administration as the US continued to view Paraguay as a staunchly anti-communist ally.[22] Stroessner's March 1968 visit to Washington, D.C., further reveals the lack of concern government officials had for the authoritarian nature of the Stroessner regime. *Stroessner's Paraguay*, a CIA special report, highlights how the US viewed Paraguay in favorable terms. The eight-page report was written just over two weeks before Stroessner's visit to Washington, D.C.; he would be visiting the US and speaking with Johnson from March 20-22. The document explicitly calls Stroessner an authoritarian leader. It references a change made to the Paraguayan constitution in 1967 to allow Stroessner to run for president consecutively in 1968 and 1973, and mentions how the conservative element of Stroessner's Colorado Party continues to oppose the idea of political coexistence with other political parties. The document states that "Paraguay takes a firm anti-communist and anti-Castro stand" in the Organization of American States, an organization comprised of the nations within the Western Hemisphere for international cooperation.[23] The language in this document shows explicit knowledge of the authoritarian nature of the Stronato, and the document makes clear references to Stroessner's anti-communist political ideology. An action memorandum sent to Johnson regarding Stroessner's 1968 visit to Washington, D.C., also illustrates the lack of concern over the Stronato's authoritarian nature. In this memorandum, Special Assistant to the President W. W. Rostow describes Johnson's responsibilities during the Stroessner visit, how Stroessner will ask for further military and economic assistance, and his image as an "old-style Latin American dictator" being the primary problem with the visit.[24] This epithet further reinforces the fact that US politicians were well aware of the repressive, dictatorial regime that Stroessner oversaw; the Kennedy and Johnson era governments were not focused on maintaining democracy in Latin America so long as the politicians in power were anti-communist.

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[21] Emphasis on stability continued on during the Johnson administration, with it becoming the primary policy goal in regard to the Latin American dictatorship. Tyvela, *Dictator Dilemma*, 50 and 75.

[22] Cooney and Mora cite the Mann Doctrine, or the idea that the US would support any government, including antidemocratic regimes, that opposed communism and remained open to US business interests as to why the Johnson administration diverged from Kennedy's focus on human rights. Cooney and Mora, *Paraguay and the United States*, 174. The Mann Doctrine is also cited by Tyvela in *The Dictator Dilemma* on page 77.

[23] Directorate of Intelligence, "Special Report: Weekly Review, Stroessner's Paraguay," March 1, 1968, Central Intelligence Agency *Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room* https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000680044.pdf.

[24] W. W. Rostow, "Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson," March 19, 1968. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico*, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d469.

THE NIXON YEARS

The US continued its focus on the stability of the anti-communist regime as the Stronato entered its second decade. The Richard Nixon administration was generally supportive of the Stronato, with historian Kirk Tyvela writing, "there was no dictator dilemma at all for the White House."[25] Under Nixon, the US had fully embraced the use of authoritarian dictators to promote anti-communism abroad. Stroessner's strong, militaristic grip on Paraguay and verbal commitment to both "defending democratic institutions" and supporting US policy gave the US confidence in the country's position as an anti-communist ally.[26] However, US-Paraguay relations became strained toward the end of Nixon's tenure in office. This was partially due to a drug extradition issue centered around the French-Corsican heroin trafficker Auguste Ricard.[27] Paraguay did eventually agree to extradite Ricard, leading to a return to more stable relations between the US and Paraguay.[28] The normalization of these relations means that the US would continue to provide support to the stability of the Paraguayan regime.

Following the Ricard situation, Congress was forced to reassess the US's policy toward Paraguay, and US politicians began expressing concern over the authoritarian nature of the dictatorship. The extradition of Ricard resulted in the 1976 hearing of the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, which, while focusing primarily on human rights violations in Uruguay, also included witness testimonies about human rights violations under Stroessner.[29] Whereas this hearing provided further awareness of human rights issues, such as unlawful imprisonments, no immediate changes were made. The hearing was not the only example of political officers expressing concerns and not being heard. Aurelia Brazeal, a County Officer for Paraguay and Uruguay, wrote to the Political Officer of the Embassy in Uruguay expressing her concerns about the human rights issues and received a response stating that an investigation into human rights issues would be counterproductive and, while subversives were being arrested and prisoners tortured, there was no extreme treatment of prisoners.[30] These concerns over human rights violations and

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[25] Tyvela, *The Dictator Dilemma*, 102.
[26] Tyvela, *The Dictator Dilemma,* 106.
[27] Paraguay during the Stronato had a history of sheltering criminals involved in the drug trade. One such criminal was Auguste Ricard who was heavily involved with heroin trafficking. Paraguay was hesitant to allow extradition. Tyvela *Dictator Dilemma*, 112.
In a memorandum to President Nixon on narcotics cooperation in Paraguay, Secretary of State William P. Rogers wrote that Nixon should write to Stroessner and express the fact that the US and Paraguay's relationship would be in danger if Paraguay continues to be uncooperative with the Ricard extradition request. William P. Rogers, "Memorandum from Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon," July 28, 1972. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969-1972,* https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d574.
[28] Cooney and Mora, *Paraguay and the United States,* 191.
[29] Tyvela, *The Dictator Dilemma*, 118.
[30] While the response Brazeal receives is from the Uruguayan Embassy, the letter still provides a good example of how complaints about human rights violations were not being taken seriously.

other influences caused people within the US to begin questioning the relationship between the US and the South American dictator. These concerns continue throughout the remainder of the Stronato.

CARTER, REAGAN, AND INCREASING HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS

It was not until President Jimmy Carter's administration began in 1977 that human rights violations began to directly impact US policy in Paraguay. During this administration, anti-communism was no longer a sufficient justification for providing mostly unconditional support for the Stronato.[31] The shift to a human rights-focused international policy meant politicians could no longer ignore the authoritarian nature of the Stroessner regime, as evidenced through a conversation between Carter and Stroessner in September 1977. In a memorandum on this conversation, Stroessner responded to Carter's concerns about human rights by stating that any imprisonments are legal and justified.[32] Carter's direct confrontation in this moment shows the importance that was being placed on human rights. Evidence of suspicious imprisonments was also made available to the US during the Carter administration. Epifanio Mendez, a Paraguayan politician and author, was arrested in Argentina shortly after sending a letter to Jack Watson, Carter's White House Chief of Staff, on how the Paraguayan government was not following US human rights policy objectives.[33] Human rights became something on which aid was contingent. In a memorandum on loans to Brazil, multiple officials argued that Brazil should be denied the loans in order to strengthen the US's consistency when it came to human rights policies.[34] By denying Brazil loans for human rights violations, the US would indicate to other South American countries, like Paraguay, that they were serious about halting aid to countries that did not promote democracy.

As the Stronato entered its last decade, its relationship with the US became tumultuous. The Ronald Reagan administration initially re-embraced authoritarian rulers, arguing that authoritarian regimes could gradually be

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Russell E. Olson, "Letter from Russell E. Olson, Political Officer of the Embassy in Uruguay to Aurelia A. Brazeal, County Officer for Uruguay and Paraguay, ARA-LA/APU," August 8, 1975, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1076, Volume E011, Part 2, Documents on South American, 1973-1976, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d342*

[31] Tyvela, *The Dictator Dilemma*, 128.

[32] During this conversation, Stroessner also asked that loans not be pulled as it would impede Paraguayan development.
"Memorandum of Conversation," September 6, 1977, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XXIV, South America; Latin America Region,* https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v24/d290.

[33] Peter Tarnoff, "Memorandum for Dr, Zbgniew Brzezinski, The White House,"October 22, 1977, Department of State *Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room* https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/LETTER%20TO%20JACK%20WATSON%20FRO%5B15516000%5D.pdf

[34] "Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Schneider) and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Stedman) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)," November 25, 1977, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XXIV, South America; Latin America Region,* https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v24/d169

liberalized while communist regimes could not be.[35] This anti-communist ideology was a return to the political justification seen during the earlier years of the relationship between Stroessner and US politicians. In 1981, US officials agreed to continue providing economic support to the country.[36] The provision of support once again connected an anti-communist ideology and desire for stability in authoritarian states as a crucial facet of American foreign policy. Restrictions on Paraguay were further reduced in 1982, justified by the assumption that authoritarian regimes would be more willing to cooperate with the US if they were not facing critiques or consequences for their human rights issues.[37] The renewal of military and economic support during the Reagan administration shows that the focus on stability and anti-communism remained. A 1984 report on security assistance to Paraguay states that the US should continue to provide military support. The military was considered a crucial factor in moving Paraguay toward democracy, as training in the US "often has a significant and lasting effect on the attitudes of individual officers toward political values and basic human rights."[38] Ideally, politicians believed military personnel would take their US-based training and implement it in Paraguay in a way that reduced human rights violations such as extrajudicial killings and unlawful imprisonments.

The support given to Paraguay during the Reagan years did not go uncriticized, and a lack of support for the regime reemerged in the second half of the decade. In 1984, members of Americas Watch, an international committee on human rights, were denied entry into Paraguay. Members of the group were also not permitted to contact the US Embassy.[39] This indicated that Paraguay did not want Americans looking into its human rights and judicial practices. In a 1987 National Security Council Meeting, US politicians revealed concerns about democracy in South America.[40] A 1987 article from the *New York Times*, published in the University of Illinois' student newspaper, mentions how US

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[35] Tyvela, *The Dictator Dilemma*, 151.

[36] In 1981, the Reagan administration approved a loan of $63.9 million dollars.
Tyvela, *The Dictator Dilemma*, 153.
A general note about maintaining assistance to economically weak countries like Paraguay is seen in the National Security Decision Directive 71. Ronald Reagan, "National Security Decision Directive 71," November 30, 1982, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988, Volume XII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981-1984,*
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v13/d416

[37] Associated Press News, "Former aide rips lack of human rights policy," November 18, 1982, *Daily Illini*, University of Illinois *Illinois Digital Newspaper Collection*
https://idnc.library.illinois.edu/?a=d&d=DIL19821118-01.1.7&srpos=20&e=------198-en-20-DIL-1--txt-txIN-paraguay---------#documentdisplayleftpanesectionleveltabcontent

[38] American Embassy in Asunción, Paraguay, "Congressional Action on Security Assistance for Paraguay," March 8, 1984, Central Intelligence Agency *Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room*, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90b01370r000801120051-4

[39] American Embassy in Asunción, Paraguay, "Statement by Congressional Friends of Human Rights on Paraguay," May 19, 1984, Central Intelligence Agency *Freedom of INformation Act Electronic Reading Room,* https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90b01370r000801050093-6

[40] "Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting," March 13, 1987, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy*,
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v01/d295

ambassadors were attacked for speaking out against human rights violations.[41] Articles on human rights issues in another country being featured in a university newspaper demonstrate how far-reaching the knowledge of these issues was. The issue of Paraguayan state-sponsored violence against American citizens shows how authoritarian repression could no longer be justified through a need to stop the spread of communism, especially as the Cold War was coming to a close.

CHILE UNDER AUGUSTO PINOCHET

THE US AND SALVADOR ALLENDE

US relations with Chile during the Cold War were also characterized by intervention related to communist and anti-communist governments. Before the installation of the authoritarian dictator General Augusto Pinochet on September 11, 1973, Chile was led by President Salvador Allende, a man whose Marxist ideology posed a threat to the anti-communist stability that the US centered its Cold War-era foreign policy on. As revealed in a 1978 document, the CIA began anti-Allende covert actions following his first run for the presidency in 1954, such as providing financial support to anti-Allende opposition groups and moderate politicians.[42] The extreme measures evident in these covert operations show how the US feared Allende and the potential for communism that he represented. The CIA also engaged in covert operations surrounding the September 1970 election in hopes of stopping the election and inauguration of Allende.[43] The US justified its intervention in another country's democratic process as it feared a democratically elected socialist like Allende would destabilize the anti-communist policies in the region. A 1972 document titled "Background for Chilean Hearting" outlines these worries; Allende's collaboration with the Communist Party, his relationship to Cuba, the political opposition he is facing, and how Chile's turn toward socialism could motivate other Latin American countries to embrace communism are all points of concern the US had with the Allende

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[41] New York Times, "Paraguayan officials denounce US envoy's human-rights stand," March 25, 1987, *Daily Illini,* University of Illinois *Illinois Digital Newspaper Collection,* https://idnc.library.illinois.edu/?a=d&d=DIL19870325-01.1.17&srpos=25&e=------198-en-20-DIL-21--txt-txIN-paraguay---------
Also discussed is how the American ambassador, his wife, and about 35 other diplomats and opposition leaders were tear gassed during a prodemocracy forum.
Tyvela, *The Dictator Dilemma* 159 and 163

[42] This document was compiled on February 21, 1978, but has attached documents related to a 1975 statement to the Senate, a resume of contacts with the Chilean International Telephone and Telegram Corporation, and the general misconceptions related to the CIA activities in the 1970 Chilean election.
Raymond A. Warren, "Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence on Chile," February 21, 1978, Central Intelligence Agency *Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room* https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/16032110

[43] The CIA admitted to spending $7 million in Chile between 1970 and 1973, although the agency may have channeled additional funds into the country through third parties.
Stephen G. Rabe, "Overthrowing Governments: Chile and Bolivia," in *Kissinger and Latin America: Intervention, Human Rights, and Diplomacy* (Cornell University Press, 2020), 55 and 64.

administration.[44] The concerns expressed in this document outline the main policy concerns surrounding Latin America during the early 1970s: stability within anti-communist regimes, not the spread of democracy.

Allende represented neither a stable nor an anti-communist regime, pushing Chile toward socialism despite public opposition. Public opposition to Allende's programs was seen during moments such as anti-left youth protests during his first year in office and a failed coup attempt in early 1973.[45] The conflict came to a head in September 1973 when the military staged a coup, killing Allende and installing Pinochet as leader. Shortly following the coup, Pinochet spoke with the Chief of the US Military Advisory Group, Colonel Urrutia. Pinochet said the new Chilean government would break ties with the Soviet Union and other communist countries, spoke on acquiring US aid in terms of military and food support, and mentioned his desire to strengthen the relationship between Chile and the US.[46] The interaction described in this memorandum foreshadows the ease with which the US would accept the authoritarian regime of Pinochet. The anti-communist Pinochet had successfully overthrown the left-wing Allende, allowing Chile to cut ties with Cuba and reaffirm its relationship with the US.[47] Pinochet's overthrow of Allende affirmed the US's idea that a communist-aligned state was unstable. The militaristic stability that Pinochet supplied, as well as his anti-communist stance, made the US's decision to recognize the regime and provide it with "goodwill" understandable.[48] While the installation of Pinochet as the leader of Chile represented a move away from democracy, his government was still recognized by the US because he solidified himself as an anti-communist ally.

RESPONSE TO THE PINOCHET GOVERNMENT

The response to the new Chilean government was varied. The CIA received some criticism for its perceived involvement. It reportedly did provide support to

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[44] "Background for Chilean Hearing," March 23, 1972, Central Intelligence Agency *Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room* https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005496321

[45] Associated Press News, "Anti-leftist protest continues in Chile," December 3, 1971, *Daily Illini*, from University of Illinois *Illinois Digital Newspaper Collections,* https://idnc.library.illinois.edu/?a=d&d=DIL19711203.2.9&srpos=1&e=------197-en-20-DIL-1--txt-txIN-Allende----1971-----

[46] "Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to president Nixon," September 14, 1973, *Foreign Relations of the United Syayes, 1969-1976, Volume XXI, Chile, 1969-1973,* https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969the -76v21/d355

[47] Tanya Harmer, "Fractitious Allies: Chile, the United States, and the Cold War, 1973-1976," *Diplomatic History* 37, no. 1 (2013): 109.

[48] "Goodwill" comes from meeting minutes on September 20, 1973. During this meeting, officials also discussed how the United States was planning on handling economic assistance to the new government, when the US should announce their recognition of the new Chilean government, and briefly mentioned refugee policy and the OAS Human Rights Commission.
"Minutes of a Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group," September 20, 1973, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXI, Chile, 1969-1973,* https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d361

Allende's opposition groups, but the US and CIA denied having any involvement with the actual coup.[49] The lack of involvement by the CIA in facilitating the coup was not fully believed. Leftist activist groups in both the US and Latin America placed responsibility for the coup onto the US.[50] The issue of democracy was also a concern. Two days after the coup, *The Daily Illini* published an editorial titled "Democracy undermined in Chile," which criticized the fact that Chile was now under a military regime and claimed that providing support to the regime would be "unjustifiable intervention" that would "perpetuate the anti-communist ideology that resulted in the Vietnam War."[51] Americans were split in reaction to Chile's fall to dictatorship; some Americans protested and wrote against the fall, while others, who had not been in support of Allende's presidency, were more accepting of the new military rule. An editorial by another student focuses on the issues within the Allende administration, calling some of his acts dictatorial, primarily focusing on the economic issues caused by nationalizing certain industries and removing government support of anti-Allende newspapers.[52] Americans also criticized rallies that were being held in protest of the Chilean government and the US attitude toward it. In the anti-communist periodical *The Pink Sheet on the Left*, no. 83, "US radicals" were critiqued while readers are encouraged to reach out to government officials and local newspapers to reiterate their support for their "anti-Communist friends in Chile."[53] Both the support and criticism of Pinochet's military regime emphasized American ideas about communism and democracy. Americans were supportive of the anti-communist nature of the regime but critical of its lack of democracy.

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[49] A memorandum was sent to Henry Kissinger by William J. Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to discuss how the US's covert actions in Chile should be discussed.
"Memorandum from Filliam J. Jordan of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)," September 16, 1973, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXI, Chile, 1969-1973*,
https://history.state.gov/hstoricaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d356

[50]Associated Press News, US waiting on Chile recognition," September 13, 1973, *Daily Illini*, University of Illinois *Illinois Digital Newspaper Collection*,
https://idnc.library.illinois.edu/?a=d&d=DIL19730913.2.10&srpos=44&e=------197-en-20-DIL-41--txt-txIN-Allende----1973-----

[51] "Democracy Undermined in Chile," September 13, 1973, *Daily Illini*, University of Illinois *Illinois Digital Newspaper Collection,*
https://idnc.library.illinois.edu/?a=d&d=DIL19730913.2.45&srpos=23&e=------197-en-20-DIL-21--txt-txIN-Allende----1973-----

[52] Tom Veal, "No tears for Chile," September 13, 1973, *Daily Illini*, University of Illinois *Illinois Digital Newspaper Collection* https://idnc.library.illinois.edu/?a=d&d=DIL19730913.2.46&e=------197-en-20-DIL-21--txt-txIN-Allende----1973-----

[53] This newsletter also includes articles on South Los Angeles, the five year anniversary of the Ted Kennedy Chippaquiddick Mystery, Vietnam veteran demonstrations, and others.
Phillip Abbott Luce, *The Pink Sheet on the Left: America's Authoritative Report on Left-Wing Activities, no. 83*, Washington D.C.,: Horizon House, July 22, 1974, https://search-alexanderstreet-com.proxy2.library.illinoregime;is.edu/view/work/bibliographic_entity%7Cbibliographic_details%7C4651471

HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY CONCERNS

Unlike with Stroessner in Paraguay, human rights remained a centralized issue when it came to how the US perceived Pinochet and Chile, perhaps because Chile was a larger country and more within the American consciousness. While providing stability remained a concern, focus on human rights issues seemed to overtake the desire for unconditional support of the regime. A Senate resolution on aid to Chile in 1973 recommended that economic or military aid should not be provided until the US could be sure that these rights were being protected in the country.[54] This resolution, released early on during Pinochet's military regime, indicates that the perception of human rights issues played a large factor in US support and aid decisions. The US would not be able to provide military aid because of these concerns.[55] This posed an issue as military support was important to the new Pinochet government, as military force was the one way in which the regime was maintaining stability; unfortunately, this military force was also part of the reason for human rights concerns. A 1977 paper prepared in the CIA writes that the military government in Chile sees itself as supporting national development and seems to blame the Allende administration for the issues present with the military regime.[56] This report recognizes the human repression that the military regime is enforcing. Chile continued to come under fire for its human rights violations. Human rights issues were first publicly recognized by the Pinochet regime in 1975.[57] In a CIA memorandum, it was revealed that Pinochet had publicly announced that people within his administration had overstepped their position, but these individuals were being tried and punished for it. This shows how Pinochet was trying to construct the human rights issues in Chile as an individual problem, not a systematic problem, as would later be revealed. These issues included security forces arresting foreign nationals without contacting their embassies. A 1976 *Associated Press* article outlines how the government had refused to cooperate with the Human Rights Commission of the Organization of American States.[58] Not cooperating with an international agency focused on

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[54] "Senate Resolution on Aid to Chile," October 4, 1973, *Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room*, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp75b00380r000600170031-8

[55] Pinochet found US refusal to provide military aid because of human rights concerns was unjust, mentioning how the use of military power was important for the internal security of the state. [?] Popper, "Telegram 2046 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State," April 18, 1974, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976,* https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d165

[56] "Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency," June 1977, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XXIV, South America; Latin America Region,* https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v24/d16

[57] Deputy Director for Operations, "Memorandum for the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency on Human Rights in Chile," February 21, 1975, Central Intelligence Agency *Freedom of Information Act Reading Room,* https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005492956

[58] This article was originally published in *Associated Press News* and was reprinted in the *Daily Illini*. It was accessed through the University of Illinois' Digital Newspaper Collection's digitized copies of the *Daily Illini*.
Associated Press News, "Secret report tells of Chilean persecution," June 8, 1976, *Daily Illini*, University of Illinois *Illinois Digital Newspaper Collection*

human rights highlights the authoritarian regime's repressive behavior. US politicians felt that supporting the dictatorship was directly clashing with democratic values.[59] Violations persisted into the 1980s. A 1981 article published on the eighth anniversary of the military coup emphasizes how the regime has suppressed human rights, stating that Amnesty International regards torture of citizens as officially condoned by the government.[60] An article on how the Reagan administration was considering the resumption of gun sales to Pinochet discusses how military aid had been stopped for a reason; despite the reported decrease in human rights abuses, many political dissidents were still being imprisoned.[61] These policy examples and newspaper sources demonstrate how reporting of human rights abuses, such as unlawful detentions and state-sponsored political violence, complicated US policy toward Chile, forcing policymakers to confront the tension between supporting anti-communist regimes and upholding democratic values.

As concerns over human rights persisted, conversations around a return to democratic rule continued as well. The assassination of Chilean Orlando Letelier, a former diplomat and opponent of Pinochet, on US soil heavily impacted the relationship between the US and Chile, as the US was once again forced to confront the authoritarian nature of the regime. The Chilean Supreme Court refused to extradite parties who had orchestrated the assassination to hold trial in the US; as a result, the US introduced sanctions on Chile in 1979.[62] Chile's refusal to cooperate with the US during this case shows the distance that was growing between the two countries. Concern over human rights was reiterated throughout the 1980s. A 1985 report on human rights "blasted" Chile, marking a divergence from previous conversations within the US about the regime.[63] The continuing concern over this issue coincided with conversations around democratization in Chile. In an interview with an American journalist, Pinochet describes how Chile is slowly moving toward democracy and that the US should not push the government to increase its pace, as he wanted to ensure that the transition went

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[59] Some of these US politicians included senators Edward Kennedy and Frank Church. Harmer, "Fracticious Allies," 143.

[60] Dan Slack, "Eight years after military coup, Chilean junta represses rights," September 11, 1981, *Daily Illini*, University of Illinois *Illinois Digital Newspaper Collection* https://idnc.library.illinois.edu/?a=d&d=DIL19810911-01.1.17&srpos=8&e=------198-en-20-DIL-1--txt-txIN-pinochet+AND+human+rights---------

[61] Kenneth Freed, "Does Chile's Dictator Deserve to Buy Washington's Guns," *The Los Angeles Times,* August 8, 1982, *Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room*, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00552r000100540002-1

[62] "Memorandum from Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)," November 18, 1980, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XXIV, South America: Latin America Region,* https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v24/d238

[63] Alfonso Chardy, "US Report Blasts Chile on Rights," *Miami Herald*, February 14, 1985, *Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room,* https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000201080059-0

smoothly and did not result in a fall back to communism.[64] While there was skepticism over whether or not Pinochet would allow himself to be removed from power, Pinochet did relinquish the presidency in early 1990, following the 1989 election, in which he did not run.

CONCLUSION

This paper has highlighted the importance of Paraguay and Chile as case studies when it comes to understanding US foreign policy and intervention during the Cold War. By examining how Alfredo Stroessner and Augusto Pinochet interacted with the American government, this paper has shown how US intervention during the Cold War fit within an anti-communist framework while also contradicting American values of democracy. While US leaders and politicians framed their support of governments in South America as interventions for the purpose of stopping communism and spreading democracy, in reality, US leaders supported repressive, authoritarian leaders and valued anti-communism and stability over human rights and democracy. The relationship that the US had with Stroessner in Paraguay and Pinochet in Chile demonstrates how supposed American values of freedom and democracy were overlooked during the fight to stop communism.

[64] Roger Fontain, "Don't push Chile, Pinochet warns," *Washington Times*, July 23, 1985, *Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room*, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965rintervention000302050030-2

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